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Populism, International Courts, and Women’s 
Human Rights 
NIENKE GROSSMAN†  
Since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, 
and the United Kingdom chose to “brexit,” many international 
lawyers and scholars have spiraled into somewhat of an existential 
crisis. What of the rule of international law or universal human rights 
when, as Candidate Trump declared upon accepting the Republican 
Party’s nomination, “Americanism, not globalism, will be our 
credo”?1  His populist “America First” refrain, combined with 
subsequent policy decisions withdrawing the United States from 
treaties and suspending participation in international bodies, led to 
doubts and questions about the relevance and resilience of the post-
WWII global order, characterized by a commitment to human rights, 
multilateralism, and international institutions. 
Despite frequent informal discussion and occasional 
international law scholarship on populism, its contours are often 
vague or conceptualized in such a way as to support a particular 
author’s arguments.2  Also, populism’s impact or potential impact on 
specific categories of international institutions or stakeholders is 
infrequently the subject of inquiry.  Few scholars have evaluated how 
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 1. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Candidate, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the 
Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016). 
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and Carry on Lawyering, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 
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populism interacts with state behavior in relation to international 
courts and tribunals, or quasi-adjudicative bodies.3  Further, it appears 
no scholarship thus far focuses on the impact of populism on the 
international legal rights of a particular group as mediated through 
these bodies.  Such analysis may deepen our understanding of the 
extent to which populism can undermine these international 
institutions, as well as populism’s potential impact on specific 
subnational or transnational stakeholders’ international legal rights.   
This contribution to the Maryland Journal of International Law’s 
symposium on populism aims to begin to explore the impact 
populism may have on gender equality, or more specifically, 
women’s human rights, as mediated by international courts and 
quasi-adjudicative bodies interpreting human rights law.  In other 
words, it considers the extent to which populism is potentially 
harmful or helpful to women’s human rights, as articulated by these 
institutions.  Prominent scholars of populism have argued that 
populism is a gender neutral concept.4  Cas Mudde and Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser propose that although populism is often associated 
with machismo, male leaders, predominantly male electorates, and 
sometimes sexist policies, populism has no real link to gender.5  
Instead, they assert, “the gender politics of populist actors are 
influenced by a combination of the national culture and 
accompanying ideology rather than by populist ideology itself.”6  
Asking the “woman question” about populism and international 
courts may be useful to bring to light hidden biases and assumptions 
in both law and institutions.7   Examining the impact of populism on 
the rights of one marginalized group may shed light on its impact on 
other such groups as well.   
Does populism pose a threat to women’s human rights as 
mediated by international courts and quasi-adjudicative bodies?  Part 
I begins by showing that, despite populism’s highly contested 
meaning, it is inherently anti-institutional and anti-pluralist.  
Consequently, populist governments are predisposed to reject or 
 
 3. But see Lawrence R. Helfer, Populism and International Human Rights Law 
Institutions: A Survival Guide 1–28 (iCourts, Working Paper No. 133, 2018); Erik Voeten, 
Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1–16 
(June 20, 2019). 
 4. Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Vox Populi or Vox Masculine? 
Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America, 49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 
16, 16–17 (2015). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). 
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challenge international court interpretations of women’s human rights 
that do not reflect the views of “the people” addressed by populist 
rhetoric.  The extent to which populism will harm women’s human 
rights, however, depends on at least two questions, discussed in Parts 
II and III, respectively: do populists share a regressive view of 
women’s human rights, and how likely are they to inflict harm on 
international courts and quasi-adjudicative bodies in response to 
controversial decisions?  Part III also discusses some steps 
international actors can take in response to populist challenges.  Part 
IV concludes the essay. 
I. POPULISM IS INHERENTLY ANTI-INSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-
PLURALIST. 
Because populism is inherently anti-institutional and anti-
pluralist, populist governments are likely to ignore international 
courts or quasi-adjudicative bodies’ judgments that do not reflect 
their approach to women’s human rights. The concept of populism is 
among the most highly contested in the political science literature, 
where much of the academic work on populism is found.8   It has 
been defined as a discourse, an ideology, a kind of leadership, a 
strategy, and a style, among others, and some argue that the concept 
is so vague as to lack utility.9  Somewhat surprisingly, authors rarely 
take the time to explain or define populism in the international law 
literature, despite its contestation in other fields of inquiry.10  When 
scholars do seek to define populism, three approaches predominate: 
ideational populism, populism as a political strategy, and populism as 
a style.11 
Perhaps the most favored definition of populism is the ideational 
one.12  Cas Mudde argues that populism is a “thin-centered ideology 
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
 
 8. Kurt Weyland, Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 67 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017); Cas Mudde, 
Populism: An Ideational Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 27 (Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See supra note 3.   
 11. Niels Spierings et al., Gender and Populist Radical-right Politics: An Introduction, 
49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 3, 7 (2015); Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggard, Paulina 
Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of 
the Art, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 13-14 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 
eds., 2017). 
 12. See, e.g., Voeten, supra note 3. 
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corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression 
of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”13  In his bottom-
up view, populism is rooted in morality; the people should be heard 
because they are “authentic,” while the elite, although drawn from 
“the people,” has put its own special interests above them.14  It is a 
“thin” ideology because it generally does not offer or provides few 
specific views on how society or politics or economics should be 
arranged to promote the well-being of “the people,” and it is often 
paired with a host ideology to provide such content, such as 
nationalism or socialism.15  Who makes up “the people” and “the 
elite” depends on the manifestation of populism involved.16  Some 
populists may root their definitions of these terms in nationality or 
ethnicity, while others focus on class or educational differences.17  
Mudde rejects, however, Ernesto Laclau’s argument that “the people” 
and “the elite” are merely “empty signifiers” meaning nothing at all.18 
In this version of populism, the populist leader, as the “vox 
populi” or the voice of the people, must separate him or herself from 
the elite and represents the authentic voice of the people.19  Mudde 
and co-author Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser assert that while populism 
is democratic, in that it involves popular sovereignty and majority 
rule, populism is inconsistent with liberal democracy, which includes 
independent institutions focused on protecting fundamental rights and 
minorities, and preventing “tyranny of the majority.”20  Populism 
rejects pluralism, minority rights, and the institutions that promote or 
protect them, because the will of the people reigns supreme.21 
Kurt Weyland, on the other hand, adopts a political-strategic 
approach to populism and rejects the idea that populism is a 
particular ideology or discourse.22  Populism, in his view, is “a 
political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or 
exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, 
uninstutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized 
 
 13. CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 6 (2017); See also Mudde, supra note 8. 
 14. Mudde, supra note 8, at 29–30. 
 15. Id. at 30–32. 
 16. Id. at 32–33. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 32. 
 19. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 13, at 68. 
 20. Id. at 80–81.   
 21. Id. at 81.   
 22. See generally Weyland, supra note 8. 
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followers.”23  For Weyland, populism is not bottom-up; it’s top-down. 
The charismatic leader identifies the “will of the people” and uses it 
to mobilize and direct followers.24  A hallmark of populism is the 
direct and personalized connection between the leader and the people, 
often through mass rallies and media, and without cold institutions or 
procedural mechanisms getting in the way.25  Populism is by 
definition personalistic, opportunistic, and flexible, and therefore, 
movements rooted in ideological purity do not qualify as “populist” 
and tend to stay on the margins of political life.26  Weyland rejects 
ideational or discursive definitions of populism, in part, because of 
their democratic valence; in his view, populism is more concerned 
with the leader’s power, rather than the people’s will.27  In the same 
vein, populist leaders brush away or seek to diminish the leverage of 
other actors – including established elites, political parties, and civil 
society – who may seek power for themselves or to limit populist 
leaders’ power.28 
Pierre Ostiguy presents a third “socio-cultural” or relational 
approach, which, in many ways builds upon Weyland’s work.29   
Rather than viewing populism as a top-down or bottom up 
phenomenon, Ostiguy views it as going both ways, and containing 
both socio-cultural and politico-cultural components.30  It is the 
“antagonistic appropriation for political, mobilizational purposes of 
an ‘unpresentable Other,’ itself historically created in the process of 
a specific ‘proper’ civilizational project,” such as liberalism or 
multiculturalism or European integration.31  Populism is 
“performative,” in that its politicians bring to light these groups in 
“inappropriate” and “transgressive” ways, rather than in accordance 
with proper norms of public behavior.32  Populist leaders “flaunt the 
low” and desecrate what is considered the “high.”33  High and low 
refer to ways of relating to people (socio-cultural) and how to make 
decisions in politics (politico-cultural). 34 In the socio-cultural 
 
 23. Id. at 50.   
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 59.   
 26. Id. at 68.   
 27. Id. at 53.   
 28. Id. at 56-57. 
 29. Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF POPULISM 73 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 75. 
 32. Id. at 76.   
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 78. 
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context, “high” means “well-behaved, proper, composed,” while low 
includes slang, folksy language, “raw, culturally popular tastes.”35 
Importantly, populism is characterized by a specific script 
asserting that the authentic voices of the majority of the people are 
not heard, and their interests are not safeguarded, resulting in moral 
indignation.36  Loudly, publicly, and aggressively pointing to the 
“nefarious minority” and mobilizing against it are therefore necessary 
populist techniques.37  The minority may include “the oligarchy, the 
Jews, a socially dominant ethnic minority, the financial sector, the 
immigrants, the liberal elite, white colonizers, or black minorities, 
depending on the casting of the social antagonist.”38  In addition, 
politico-culturally, “high” means favoring “formal, impersonal, 
legalistic, institutionally mediated models of authority,” while “low” 
includes “personalistic, strong (often male) leadership,” which is 
charismatic and close to “the people.”39  For example, the low is 
generally unconcerned with acting in a manner considered improper 
by the international community and focuses instead on the 
relationship with the people.40 
These three predominant theoretical approaches to populism 
may have gendered consequences for women’s human rights as 
interpreted by international courts.  Whichever definition of populism 
one chooses, it is likely to result in rejection of decisions of 
international courts which expand women’s rights beyond “the 
people’s” desires, because all three definitions of populism are anti-
pluralist.  Instead, populisms appear to thrive on their exclusivity.  
Ideational populism relies on an antipathy between the “pure people” 
and the “corrupt elite”; it cannot exist without creating clear 
boundaries between them.   You are either part of “the people,” or 
you are not.41  Populists do not exclude all women from “the people”; 
in fact, populists have, at times, taken steps to expand women’s 
suffrage, like Juan and Eva Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in 
Brazil42 and increased the percentage of women in representative 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 76. 
 37. Id. at 76-77. 
 38. Id. at 76. 
 39. Id. at 81-82. 
 40. Id. at 83. 
 41. Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism?, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 1, 21 
(2016). 
 42. Karen Kampwirth, Introduction, Gender and Populism in Latin America, 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1, 4 (2010). 
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office.43  Yet populist governments are likely to seek to limit social 
progress to what “the people’s” views are on what women’s rights 
should be.  Further, if a women’s rights or feminist agenda is 
considered “elitist,” as opposed to associated with “the people,” the 
populist government is likely to demonize decisions or act against 
policies that promote it.  The political-strategic and socio-cultural 
approaches are similarly anti-pluralist. Whatever groups or interests 
remain outside the tight relationship between the personalistic leader 
and the people, including civil society groups representing the views 
of Others in the society, are to be brushed aside.  For socio-cultural 
populists, the voices of the “authentic” people are ignored, while 
“nefarious” minorities are given too much attention.44  To the extent 
that feminists or women’s rights activists are part of the “nefarious 
minority,” or associated with powerful global forces, they are to be 
demonized.   
On the other hand, international human rights courts and quasi-
adjudicative bodies, which find facts and interpret and apply 
international human rights law, are rooted in liberal notions of 
individual rights.  As Laurence Helfer has pointed out, international 
human rights bodies are pluralist in nature, and they can serve as 
counter-majoritarian backstops to domestic courts.45  International 
courts tell states when their domestic laws do not go far enough in 
protecting the rights of historically disfavored groups, or when 
domestic courts do not apply the law equally to all groups or 
individuals in a society, or when the executive branch fails to take 
action necessary to comply with supranational human rights 
obligations.  In interpreting human rights, these bodies have, at times, 
issued decisions that expand the rights of the vulnerable or socially 
disfavored, and they have utilized interpretive techniques which favor 
such outcomes.46  Because of their inherent anti-pluralism, populist 
states are likely to reject decisions that expand women’s human rights 
beyond the desires of “the people,” as understood by the leader.47 
All three approaches to populism are also inherently anti-
institutionalist, which facilitates populist governments’ decisions to 
ignore or reject the work of international courts.  Populism is rooted 
in a personal and direct and unmediated relationship between the 
 
 43. See, e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4. 
 44. See Ostiguy, supra note 29, at 76. 
 45. See Helfer, supra note 3. 
 46. See Id. (discussing the pro hominem principle). 
 47. See Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, 
Perspectives on Politics, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2, 5, (2019). 
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leader and the people, whether top-down, bottom-up or two-way.  
Institutions are to be pushed aside when they get in the way of the 
leader and the people’s preferences.  International human rights 
courts, on the other hand, are institutions often located far from 
where facts giving rise to a dispute arose and are composed of 
international judges elected by several states.  Judges are charged 
with serving as neutral arbiters of the rights and duties of states and 
individuals through application of principles of law and without 
regard for majoritarian preferences in a particular respondent state.  
The role of international courts and judges is wholly at odds with 
populist leaders who seek to effectuate their agendas with no 
constraints; populist leaders instead seek “to bend or even break 
[institutional] limitations” and erode checks and balances.48  Further, 
if populist leaders reject domestic institutions when they counteract 
the will of the people, they are even more likely to attack 
international ones when they issue unpopular decisions.49  The farther 
away the decision-makers are from the true and authentic people and 
the more counter-majoritarian their decisions are, the less legitimate 
they are likely to be in populist eyes.50   
Populisms’ anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist qualities appear 
incompatible with international human rights courts’ commitment to 
liberal notions of human rights and role as an impartial counter-
majoritarian check on power.  Nonetheless, whether populism is 
harmful to gender equality in the international courts context may 
ultimately turn on the extent to which “the people’s” understanding 
of women’s human rights is unduly restrictive or regressive.   
II. POPULISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Despite their anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist nature, 
populist governments are unlikely to react negatively to international 
court decisions on women’s human rights unless they transgress what 
“the people” want, as understood by the leader.  If a populist 
movement favors women’s human rights generally, or some aspect of 
women’s human rights, it may embrace court decisions that promote 
its vision.  On the other hand, if support for women’s human rights is 
associated with the elite or a nefarious minority or Other, then 
populists will reject court decisions that validate such views.  
 
 48. Kurt Weyland, Foreward, in Gender and Populism in Latin America: Passionate 
Politics, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS, i, ix-x (2010). 
 49. See Voeten, supra note 46, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 7.   
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Consequently, whether populism is inherently harmful for women’s 
human rights as mediated through international courts depends, at 
least in part, on populism’s approach to women’s human rights, or 
what “the people” believe about the contours of women’s rights. 
Unfortunately, existing social science literature generally does 
not evaluate the relationship between populism and attitudes toward 
women’s human rights, and the relationship between gender and 
populism is understudied,51 especially outside of Europe and the 
Americas.52 Nonetheless, to seek to better understand populism’s 
potential impact on women’s human rights, this section considers 
populism’s (or populisms’) relationship to gender by examining 
scholarship on populist parties’ electorate, leaders, platforms, and 
rhetoric.   
Although not dispositive on a party’s views on women’s human 
rights, it is worth noting that men appear to make up a greater share 
of voters for European populist radical right parties than women. In 
seven Northern and Western Europe countries, populist radical right 
parties received more votes from men than from women; about sixty 
percent of supporters were men.53  Other parties on the center right, 
however, received similar support from men; in other words, populist 
radical right parties were not outliers when compared to other parties 
on the center right.54  Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove found, 
however, that gender equality attitudes did not distinguish populist 
radical right voters from left- and center-right voters in seven 
European countries; instead, anti-immigrant positions were the main 
drivers of votes for the populist radical right.55  Interestingly, the 
study showed some evidence that individuals with authoritarian or 
nativist views paired with beliefs in gay and lesbian rights had a 
disproportionately high likelihood of voting for populist radical right 
parties in Sweden and Norway.56  In the United States, women voters 
preferred Democrat Hillary Clinton over right wing populist Donald 
Trump, by a twelve-point margin, while men preferred Trump over 
Clinton by a twelve point margin.57  On the other hand, in Latin 
 
 51. See Weyland, supra note 47, at viii. 
 52. Valentine M. Moghadam & Gizem Kaftan, Right-wing populisms north and south: 
Varieties and gender dynamics, 75 WOMEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 1, 1 (2019). 
 53. Niels Spierings & Andrej Zaslove, Gendering the vote for populist radical-right 
parties, 49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 135, 147 (2015). 
 54. Id. at 152. 
 55. Id. at 152, 154. 
 56. Id. at 158. 
 57. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, 
Education, PEW RES. CEN. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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America, populists from multiple ideological perspectives have 
purposefully pursued the female vote, and sometimes have even 
received a much higher percentage of female votes than male ones.58 
From a political representation standpoint, males are a 
significant proportion of populist leaders, but there have also been 
several female ones, including France’s Marine Le Pen, the United 
States’ Sarah Palin, Argentina’s Evita Perón, and Denmark’s Pia 
Kjaersgaard.59  Many are relatives of male leaders, but several are 
not.60  In Northern Europe, men dominate leadership positions in 
populist radical right parties, even when the top leader is a woman.61  
One study showed populist radical right parties from Denmark and 
the Netherlands tended to have lower percentages of women in 
national and supranational parliaments than national averages.62  On 
the other hand, the representation of women in parliaments in Bolivia 
and Venezuela increased after left-wing populists Evo Morales and 
Hugo Chávez came to power.63  In Bolivia, the percentage of women 
in Morales’s party jumped from 8% to 46%, while in Venezuela, 
Chávez’s party had 15% percent women in the 2005 to 2010 
legislature, as compared to 2% women in other parties.64  
Interestingly, in absolute terms, the percentage of women in populist 
parties in the four Northern European and South American countries 
studied was quite similar.65 
Although scholarship is sparse concerning populist 
governments’ views on women’s human rights at the international 
level, some exists about their platforms and policies on gender 
equality at the domestic level.66  Assessing whether policies are 
intended to promote or hinder gender equality or women’s human 
rights is challenging because policies may affect women of different 
class, social status, economic power, race, and other intersectional 
identities in different ways, but they still may provide some insights 
into the relationship between gender and populism. 
 
tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education. 
 58. See Kampwirth, supra note 41, at 15. 
 59. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 21-22. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 22. 
 62. Id. at 24. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 26. 
 66. See, e.g., Spierings & Zaslove, supra note 52, at 137-38; see also, generally, 
Kampwirth, supra note 41. 
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Relying on the ideational definition of populism, Mudde and 
Kaltwasser found that the relationship of Northern European and 
South American populists to gender was influenced by national 
culture and the thicker ideology populism was paired with.67  Populist 
actors reflected prevailing popular views on gender issues and roles, 
thereby adopting masculine positions in South America and a 
“gender-equal” approach in Northern Europe.68  Because South 
American populisms analyzed were left wing and Northern European 
populisms were right wing, however, South American populist 
governments were more likely to promote a gender equality agenda 
than Northern European ones.69  For example, populist radical right 
parties in Denmark and the Netherlands seemed to support gender 
equality, but did not make it a high priority and rejected affirmative 
steps by states to enhance gender equality, such as affirmative action 
or positive discrimination.70  One study of six populist radical right 
parties in Western Europe, by Tjitske Akkerman, found they shared a 
conservative view of family relations, but varied on opposition and 
attention to issues like abortion, public child care funding, and same 
sex unions and marriages.71  The same study compared the positions 
of populist radical right parties with mainstream conservative parties 
and found the former were “without exception considerably more 
conservative...” on gender equality and women’s rights.72   
Interestingly, since European radical right populist parties are 
usually conservative in liberal countries, they support their positions 
against abortion or for traditional gender roles by emphasizing liberal 
values like autonomy, and sometimes they may accept a liberal law 
as a fait accompli.73  Also, some use language about gender equality, 
freedom, and gay rights in fighting immigration from Muslim or non-
Western countries, countries they argue discriminate against women 
and homosexuals, although they have not proposed policies that 
support gender equality or gay rights for immigrants.74  Radical right 
 
 67. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 17. 
 68. Id. at 19-20. 
 69. Id. at 20.   
 70. Id. at 27. 
 71. Tjitske Akkerman, Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: a 
Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas, 49 PATTERNS PREJUDICE  37, 48-49 (Apr. 15, 
2015). 
 72. Id. at 52. 
 73. Id. at 56-57. 
 74. Id. at 58; see also Stefanie Mayer, Edma Ajanovic, & Birgit Sauer, Intersections and 
Inconsistencies: Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria, 22 NORDIC 
J. FEMINIST & GENDER RES. 250, 250- 266 (2014) (discussing framing of gender in right wing 
populist discourse in Austria). 
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populist parties in Turkey, Hungary, and Poland have adopted “pro-
natalist” policies, encouraging women to have more children to 
propagate “the nation.”75  In Poland, the right wing populist Law and 
Justice Party, among other policy proposals, sought to ban abortion 
shortly after taking power, resulting in mass mobilization of women 
in opposition.76 
Latin American populisms, both left and right-wing, have had a 
varied relationship with gender equality or women’s rights policies.  
Classical populists, from the 1930s to the 1960s, provided women 
with jobs, voting rights, and educational opportunities in several 
countries, while neo-populists in the 1980s  and 1990s  had a more 
complicated relationship with second wave feminism, which had 
more nuanced demands on topics such as domestic violence, 
sexuality, and reproductive rights.77  While some populist leaders, 
like Nicaragua’s Arnoldo Alemán, attacked feminists as “elites,” 
others sought to incorporate them into their coalitions, like Peru’s 
Alberto Fujimori, who helped create electoral gender quotas, 
appointed women to cabinet positions, and expanded access to 
contraception.78  At the same time, he and several of his health 
ministers have faced criminal charges for presiding over a forced 
sterilization policy affecting thousands of Peruvian indigenous 
women.79   
In the third wave of populism in Latin America, leaders like 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales promoted 
women’s rights in some significant ways, yet limited its reach in 
others.80  For example, Venezuelan and Bolivian left-wing populist 
platforms included explicit language about the importance of the 
rights of women, openly discussed the importance of gender equality 
in promoting revolutionary agendas, and pushed for and achieved 
constitutional and legislative change.81  Morales had a more complex 
relationship with self-identified feminists, however, who were 
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perceived as linked to foreign NGOs and the United Nations, and 
therefore, distinct from indigenous women’s interests.82  When 
different groups of women – indigenous, lower class and rural 
women vs. liberal, middle-class and urban women – took different 
views on women’s rights policies, Morales chose not to take a 
position in the debate.83  Chávez created a new National Institute for 
Women by presidential decree, which presided over several women’s 
groups and included longtime feminists, and the Chávez government 
promoted policies to lessen domestic burdens and to create new 
opportunities for public participation for poorer women.84  At the 
same time, some Venezuelan feminists have expressed concerns that 
new policies have not changed the basic patriarchal structures in 
Venezuela.85  Overall, Kurt Weyland argues that populist leaders in 
Latin America may be more comfortable with “feminine” rather than 
“feminist” demands.  While feminine demands “seek specific, 
practical improvements for women while taking their basic insertion 
in society and family as given,” feminist demands are concerned with 
achieving strategic reforms “to guarantee women autonomy and 
equality.”86 
In the United States, the right-wing populist Trump 
administration has taken explicit steps to undermine women’s human 
rights, at least in regard to reproductive and sexual health. Several 
human rights bodies charged with interpreting and applying 
international human rights law, have determined that access to such 
healthcare for women is a human right.87  Nonetheless, at a 2019 UN 
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summit, U.S. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services Alex Azar declared that the United States and eighteen other 
countries, many with problematic human rights records, wished to 
eliminate reference to terms such as “reproductive health and rights” 
in UN documents because they may “undermine” the family and 
promote abortion.88  In addition, the State Department began omitting 
information about availability of abortion, access to contraception, 
maternal mortality, and discrimination against women in health care 
from its human rights reports, resulting in complaints from civil 
society groups and members of Congress.89  The US also threatened 
to veto a UN Security Council resolution on sexual violence in 
conflict unless language calling on UN bodies and donors to provide 
“sexual and reproductive health” assistance to survivors of sexual 
violence was cut.90  In March 2019, the US announced it would 
reduce $210,000 in funding to the Organization of American States, 
amounting to 5% of US funding for the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights, because of its alleged advocacy of abortion rights, 
although only one of its 253 press releases in 2019 concerned 
abortion.91 
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Populist leaders also frequently use gendered rhetoric.92  In Latin 
America, masculinity and a macho style are “hallmarks” of most 
populist leaders, but populist leaders also depict women as essential 
actors in social change.93  Both Morales and Chávez seemed to speak 
about women as both important political actors and as maternal 
figures who sacrifice on behalf of others. 94  At the same time, Chávez 
often exalted his sexual prowess and homophobic beliefs, and 
Morales plays up gossip on his sexual affairs with women.95  In the 
United States, President Donald Trump has made statements calling 
attention to the size of his genitals,96 as well as used misogynist 
language on multiple occasions.  He has insulted women’s 
appearances, referred to women as animals, such as pigs and dogs, 
publicly mocked their bodily functions, including urination and 
menstruation, and made fun of the weight and shape of women’s 
bodies.97  Across the Atlantic, Mudde and Kaltwasser found that 
Northern European parties did not have a particularly sexist or 
masculine discourse, but Eastern and Southern European parties did.98  
Pia Kjaersgaard, a long-time female leader of the Danish right wing 
populist party spoke out explicitly against the feminist movement and 
argued that its demands for gender equality have gone too far.99  
Interestingly, when arguing against Islamic immigration to Europe, 
however, right wing populist parties have used gendered rhetoric 
about preserving women’s rights and preventing “Islamic gender 
apartheid.”100  Elzbieta Korulczuk and Agnieszka Graff argue that in 
recent years, illiberal populists in Poland and across the globe are 
increasingly and actively promoting an anti “gender ideology” 
discourse, in which leaders argue that individual rights must be 
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replaced with the rights of the traditional family as a basic unit of 
society, and that religious conservatism is under attack.101  Feminism 
or gender equality movements are perceived as “powerful and foreign 
‘colonizers.’”102  From the left wing, Evo Morales has argued that 
colonialism has negatively affected gender relations, for example, by 
asserting that machismo is a foreign import, and that Bolivia should 
return to indigenous norms on gender relations instead.103   
The relationship between populism and policies promoting 
women’s rights is challenging to disentangle.  In much of the existing 
research, populism is variously or vaguely defined, making 
generalizations about populism’s relationship to gender and women’s 
rights difficult to draw.  Authors who do rely explicitly on a specific 
definition of populism rarely show or describe how populism 
operates apart from other kinds of social or political phenomena or 
what the impact of populism is, as distinguished from populism 
paired with a specific or thicker ideology, such as nationalism or 
authoritarianism or left-wing socialism, or even nationalism, 
authoritarian or socialism in the absence of populism. 
Yet some (tentative) conclusions can be drawn.  At a minimum, 
right wing populist parties are less likely to promote women’s rights 
or gender equality at the domestic level than third wave left-wing 
Latin American populists.  In some instances, right wing populist 
governments have taken steps actively to curtail women’s rights at 
the domestic and international levels, such as by attacking women’s 
health and reproductive rights.  Left wing populists appear more 
motivated to address gender inequality than right wing populist 
movements, and they have introduced legislative and even 
constitutional reforms to this end.  Populist leaders of all stripes may 
be less willing to accede to demands aimed at increased autonomy for 
women, or which challenge traditional understandings of family 
structures or patriarchy.  Some populist leaders, especially outside of 
Northern Europe, use macho language when speaking about women, 
while they still may recognize them as political partners.  Although 
right wing politicians have used women’s rights language to seek to 
exclude Muslim immigrants, criticism of feminism as damaging to 
local, traditional gender relations appears more common.  The 
populist narrative of the antipathy between the authentic “people” 
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and the “other” may make feminism and women’s rights easy targets 
for populist ire, as liberal ideals such as human rights and 
universalism can be reframed as efforts by foreign powers to impose 
foreign values on unsuspecting and unwilling local communities.  
The populist rhetorical strategy of “flaunting the low,”104 either by 
discussing sexual prowess or sexual affairs or insulting women does 
not necessarily directly affect women’s rights, but it may create an 
environment where such discursive behavior becomes normalized 
and may affect the way populations view their obligations to ensure 
women are not subject to sexual assault or other abusive behavior.  
III. CAN POPULIST GOVERNMENTS CAUSE HARM TO INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS? 
Populism’s relationship to gender may predispose some populist 
leaders against international adjudicative decisions that protect, 
reinforce or expand women’s human rights.  But what actions will 
they take in response? And if they seek to undermine international 
courts, how likely are they to succeed?  Rejecting or challenging 
international court decisions that counter-act domestic public opinion 
is nothing new, and it is certainly not limited to populist 
governments.  Scholars have been struggling with what drives states 
to comply with or ignore international court rulings for many years.105  
More recently, scholars have attempted to systematize attempts to 
influence international courts and forms of resistance to international 
courts, such as verbal critiques, non-compliance, exit, or attempts to 
terminate a court.106  They have also distinguished between 
“pushback,” or reacting negatively to some legal development and 
seeking to reverse it within the system, versus extraordinary 
“backlash,” questioning the authority of the court itself and aiming to 
transform or close the court.107  Despite the dearth of research on the 
nature of populist governments’ reactions to unpalatable international 
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court or quasi-adjudicative body decisions, there is reason to believe 
populist governments favor backlash over pushback.   
As discussed above, prevailing definitions of populism are anti-
institutional.108  Philip Alston proposes populists are particularly 
dangerous to the human rights movement because they are 
comfortable with flaunting their disdain of social conventions.109  
They are willing to break rhetorical and legal boundaries previously 
left undisturbed, including long-held assumptions about 
multilateralism and human rights.  Eric Posner argues that criticizing 
international courts is part and parcel of the populist challenge to 
international institutions associated with the post-WWII liberal order, 
which in their view, is run by disconnected elites and the nefarious 
establishment.110  In a first empirical work on the relationship 
between populism and backlash on international courts, Erik Voeten 
found that eighteen of twenty-eight backlash episodes against 
international courts originated from populist leaders. 111 
Although backlash against international courts and quasi-
adjudicative bodies is considered “very rare,”112 a number of 
examples exist in recent years of populist governments exiting, 
undermining and attacking them. For example, Venezuela’s President 
Chávez denounced the American Convention on Human Rights and 
withdrew Venezuela from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
following an unfavorable court decision and several clashes with the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights.113  Populist presidents in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela joined together in an 
effort to move the headquarters of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights out of the United States, to restrict discretionary 
spending, and to limit the role of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression.114  Although framed as an effort to reform and 
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strengthen the Inter-American System, many of the countries 
promoting these changes had received great scrutiny for human rights 
violations, and human rights groups and think tanks warned these 
proposals were dangerous to the Commission’s work.115   
While the Obama Administration blocked the reappointment of 
a member of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body in May 
2016, citing disagreement with his on-the-record questions and 
decisions, the Trump Administration raised broader concerns about 
Appellate Body members’ continued service on pending appeals after 
their terms expired, as well as other concerns about deviance in 
Appellate Body reports from WTO rules, and it blocked numerous 
proposals for reform or to fill vacancies.116  Rather than engaging 
with proposed amendments, the United States has “responded with 
disinterest” and failed to explain its disagreement with proposals.117  
Starting in January 2020, only one member of the Appellate Body 
remains in office, leaving the multilateral trade system’s dispute 
settlement regime on the verge of collapse.118  The Trump 
Administration has also interacted with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in unprecedented ways for the United 
States.  It failed to appear at hearings for the first time in history,119 
failed to lobby for its own nominee to the Commission, resulting in 
the second time in history that the United States candidate lost an 
election,120 contributed zero dollars in voluntary contributions to the 
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Commission’s limited budget in 2018, and subsequently, seriously 
considered defunding the Commission entirely for supporting 
women’s rights to reproductive health.121  To the extent populist 
governments favor backlash, these examples show how a populist 
government’s displeasure with one or a series of decisions has the 
potential to impact meaningfully an entire international court or 
quasi-adjudicative body and the legal regime it interprets and applies. 
When populist governments have powerful tools within a 
specific international court system, like the ability to block the 
appointment of adjudicators, withdraw significant amounts of 
funding, or mobilize powerful allies, successful backlash is likely 
more feasible.  At the same time, even powerful populist 
governments face challenges in transforming displeasure into facts on 
the ground. Terminating an international court—the gravest form of 
backlash—is a collective effort, which requires agreement among 
multiple member states.122  Populist governments have a tough time 
cobbling together multilateral reform coalitions because of their 
“thin” ideologies.123  Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 
were ultimately unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade OAS 
member states to move the Inter-American Commission outside the 
United States or to limit external funding for the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression.124  In examining backlash episodes in 
three different African regional courts, Alter, Gathii, and Helfer 
found that consensus voting rules, too, presented obstacles for states 
seeking to modify a court’s jurisdiction and access; following rules 
and internal procedures for change required agreement of multiple 
states and gave tempers a chance to cool.125  In addition, states need 
broad agreement of both substantial international and domestic actors 
to torpedo a court successfully.126  To shift from pushback to 
backlash, more than mere disagreement of experts or strong 
government resistance is needed; broader campaigns and public 
mobilizations provide the requisite support.127  Without domestic and 
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international backing, populist states may still choose other forms of 
resistance, such as exiting a particular court, failing to comply with a 
court’s decision, or denouncing it in public forums.  While these 
steps certainly can negatively affect international courts, they are less 
extreme than terminating or effectively blocking the functioning of 
an adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative body. 
States and other actors appear to have multiple tools at their 
disposal in responding to populist backlash.  Mobilizing both 
domestic and international constituencies to block harmful actions 
against these bodies is one important strategy, since states need 
public support at the domestic level and multilateral support at the 
international level to engage in successful backlash.128  Karen Alter, 
James Gathhi, and Laurence Helfer attributed disparate outcomes in 
response to controversial decisions in three African regional courts to 
variations in the mobilization of secretariats, civil society, and sub-
regional parliaments.129  Secretariats, composed of a political 
appointee and professional staff, can serve as backstops to backlash 
efforts when professional and independent, and they can also create 
opportunities for meaningful civil society awareness and 
engagement.130  Sub-regional parliaments, when more than just “talk 
shops,” can also play a role in supporting international bodies 
through resolutions and interaction with the courts themselves, if 
appropriate.131  Ensuring that these bodies have strong institutional 
procedures and consensus practices may also enhance their resilience 
in the face of backlash.132  The nature of other states’ and 
international organizations’ responses and their leverage over 
populist states may help determine the effectiveness of backlash as 
well. 
In the case of women’s human rights, domestic and transnational 
civil society may be of particular importance.  Both domestic and 
transnational constituencies have strong interests in responding to 
efforts to hobble bodies interpreting women’s human rights, both for 
the sake of women’s human rights, and for the sake of protecting the 
human rights system as a whole.  For example, in response to efforts 
to defund the Inter-American Commission for allegedly supporting 
abortion rights, a group of former US Commissioners and nominees 
sought to explain why funding the Commission was consistent with 
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federal law,133  Democratic senators wrote to U.S. Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo in support of funding,134 and fifty domestic and 
international nongovernmental organizations decried the negative 
impact that defunding the Commission would have on human rights 
in the region.135  Soon thereafter, Pompeo announced cuts of 5% in 
US funding, but did not eliminate all funding for the Commission.136 
Although empirical data is sparse, the inherent anti-pluralist and 
anti-institutional characteristics of populism and recent actions by 
populist governments in response to unpopular decisions suggest 
populist governments may shift easily from pushback to more 
dangerous backlash.  Identification of tools for responding to 
backlash, and populist backlash specifically, and enhancing the 
resilience of international bodies, requires more scholarly and 
practical attention.  Nonetheless, consensus-based rules for reform, 
mobilization of domestic, transnational, and international 
constituencies, and the leverage of other non-populist states may help 
to prevent lasting harm, depending in part on the relative power and 
resources of populist governments.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Populism’s impact on women’s human rights as mediated 
through international courts is potentially both significant and 
harmful. Populism, in its many and varied forms, is noteworthy for its 
anti-pluralism and anti-institutionalism. Demonizing foreign judges 
who render counter-majoritarian decisions disconnected from “the 
people” fits easily within the populist narrative.  While much remains 
to be learned about the relationship between populism and women’s 
rights, the existing literature suggests most populist leaders are, at 
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least, likely to disfavor international court decisions that advance 
women’s rights in substantial ways. Populist leaders of varying 
political stripes have linked feminist demands for autonomy or to 
dismantle patriarchy to a transnational, non-autochthonous, nefarious 
“elite,” rather than “the people.” They have utilized misogynist and 
sexualized rhetoric, insulting women’s dignity and demeaning their 
status as equal rights holders in society, likely boding ill for rights-
expanding efforts. Further, right-wing populist governments, 
particularly outside of Northern Europe, are associated with 
retrogressive approaches to gender equality, especially around the 
issue of sexual and reproductive health and autonomy, and some have 
taken concrete steps to limit women’s reproductive health and 
promote pro-natalist policies.  
When dissatisfied with a court’s decision, populist governments 
appear predisposed to engage in backlash rather than pushback alone, 
endangering women’s human rights – and human rights more 
generally. Although more research is needed, at least one empirical 
study and qualitative analysis show efforts by populist governments 
to harm institutions, rather than simply push back against a specific 
unpopular decision.137  While some argue that populist critiques may 
lead to much needed reforms to these institutions, concrete real-world 
examples of such noble motives appear few and far between.  
Instead, a lack of engagement in real reform attempts at best, and 
efforts to terminate or narrow the jurisdiction of these bodies, 
potential defunding of bodies, and blocking of their functioning, at 
worst, appear more common.  Populist governments seem more 
interested in burning down the house than building a new addition or 
remodeling the kitchen.   
Whether populist governments succeed in their backlash 
depends on a number of factors, including their relative power and 
resources. States, transnational, and international constituencies 
seeking to protect these institutions from populist backlash are well-
advised to take action to enhance their resilience, by ensuring 
consensus rules exist and are followed, and secretariats and 
transnational constituencies maintain regular and open lines of 
communication.  In the face of backlash, domestic, transnational, and 
international constituencies must stand ready to mobilize in response.    
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